Strategy for Action: Using Force Wisely in the 21st Century

Let me quit the story where I began, in Afghanistan. Returning from Kabul and, in January 2008, debriefing special advisors, officials and senior officers in No. 10 and Whitehall was a sobering experience. The content of my message was simple: there was no overarching strategy to guide the campaign; we needed one and this is what it could look like.

But my message fell on deaf ears and for two reasons. First, some felt I was wrong about the lack of strategy and pointed out the error of my ways by referring me to 'our strategy'. They were referring to, of course, a British strategy not a coalition strategy. To me the idea of a British strategy seemed then - and seems now - nonsensical. How was a British strategy, focused largely on directing a relatively small British deployment, in thorough coalition terms, to just one of Afghanistan's thirty-four provinces going to make up for the lack of an thorough campaign strategy? Second, I had not recognized that, because British forces were in Helmand Province, the minds of British politicians, senior officers, officials, opinion-formers and the press had come to be fixated there too. I had failed, in other words, to perfect the first step in my Strategic appraisal and understand properly the peculiar political context to which I was returning. Having done my best to bring the key strategic message back, I watched the raging debates about the tactical issues such as equipment and the whole of boots on the ground with much private frustration. But the distinct outcome was a reinforcement in my mind of the need for new reasoning on development strategy. This book is, in part, a consequence of that frustration and of that reinforcement.

News From Afghanistan

As I write now, Afghanistan and Iraq are still playing out, arguably two personel campaigns of a more involved political contest where international terrorism, inspired by extremist Islam, is both a symptom and a tactic. Elsewhere, modern developments in North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Georgia and Gaza give pause for thought. Layered over all this is an unprecedented economic crisis. Within this crisis, we see signs that our Western order, possibly finally founded on affluence, may not be as get as we had assumed. And finally the long-term iceberg out there for our great of international politics looks to be global warming. The new international context looks volatile and history may yet have more mileage than Fukuyama predicted. All of this gives me intuit to be cautious about our strategic future. We would categorically do well to place a premium on our capability to originate and, if necessary, execute classic strategy.

I have defined politico-military strategy as a rational policy of operation that uses state power to perform a political object in the face of violent opposition. And I have outlined some of the key features gift in classic strategy: a clear statement of political purpose, a coherent organizing concept, a sense of seizing the initiative, a capacity to bind key actors, and so on. But ultimately, when you seek out a piece of real strategy, to see what it looks, feels and smells like, you find something that is inherently organic in nature; something that lives. It is, to use my earlier phrase, 'the ideas, judgments and decisions of men and women, set out in a coherent and a communicable form which, in broad terms, answers the principal question: "How are we going to do this?"'

And when all is said and done, what seems to resolve the capability of your strategy development and strategic execution is the capability of your people. classic strategy development is all about clear strategic reasoning and decisive strategic leadership. The key is to have people capable of both. In the medium-to-long term, the trick is thus to recognize such people and work ruthlessly to get them into the right places. National leaders and politicians who fail to do this will have to accept the blame for time to come politico-military failures.

I think we can also do better in the short term. Here the accountability for revision lies in the hands of those who originate and execute strategy now, be they politicians, diplomats, officials or forces officers. The uncomplicated clarification is self-education. Strategic leaders and strategists must work to understand strategy development in system and they must work to apply rigour when strategy development in institution - for those vested with the power to commit forces forces to armed disagreement and war, this accountability is not formal but is fundamental.

To help bring more insight and rigour to our strategy making, I have tried here to bring back into modern consciousness and distil the reasoning of great theorists and practitioners past. I have also set out complementary ideas based on corporate theory, forces doctrine, personal insight and arguments from first principles. But, either or not I have enhanced our body of knowledge, strategy development will never be easy. And with matters of high politics and war and with people's lives, at stake it feels right that it is not. But it also feels right to suggest that, when we pick to use armed force, our reasoning to underpin operations should be as true as humanly possible.

What then are the key lessons herein for strategy makers who wish to add rigour? They emerge plainly from the main buildings of our diagnosis of strategy development in history, system and practice.

Two lessons from the history of strategy sit above the personel insights. First, we must recognize the cumulative sway that historical ideas exert on our reasoning today, often in ways more subliminal than conscious. This leads us to the second lesson. Those who are - or aspire to be - strategy makers must know and understand this body of thought. Part Ii provides an introduction, but it is not a substitute for supplementary study, at least not for those of conscience. Two supplementary lessons emerge from the system of politico-military strategy making. First, if we pick to use state power, including armed force, to perform a political object, then the rational way for us to do so is to originate and execute a classic strategy. We are more likely to originate classic strategy with a true approach, for example using the frameworks and tools of Part Iii - but noting that these are aids, not substitutes, for hard thinking. This leads us to the second lesson, which draws on the Strategic Estimate. If we want to make classic strategy, we need to start our strategy development by answering two key questions: 'What is the political issue at contest?' and, 'What is the desired political object?' In other words, before we make a decision to fight, we must know what we will be fighting about and we must know what we want to perform by fighting.

Two final lessons emerge in Part Iv from the institution of strategy making. First, because of war's irrational nature, no matter how much rigour we use when we make strategy, events are unlikely to unfold as we envisage: 'No plan survives feel with the enemy.' Because of this, the very way we think will need to vary in dissimilar stages in our strategy making. A more prescriptive coming will be better as we originate the strategy. A more reflective coming will be better as we execute the strategy. But these dissimilar ways of reasoning are complementary, not alternatives. Second, sad to say, but processes matter. The system I have proposed for a politico-military school of strategy development can help codify these processes. Through the act of codification, states and institutions can start to judge if their strategy development processes work and, if necessary, make changes. Improved processes will be no substitute for good people but, without improvement, the danger is that strategy development will remain a disorganized, undisciplined intellectual activity.

The bottom line lesson, probably more prominent than all others is that ultimately, it's all about people. Poor strategy is the supervene of errors of thinking. And people are the source of the thinking. So, if an execution or war is going badly, we need to look critically not only at our strategy but also at our senior people, political, diplomatic, civil and forces and resolve either the source of the problem is broader than the strategy and, if necessary, be ruthless in development changes.

It will be interesting, in time, to see how history judges the strategies, the strategy development and the strategy makers of the modern campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. How will results portion up against our three tests of classic strategy: effectiveness, efficiency and durability of result? I intuit that, in the sober light of historical analysis, pluses and minuses will emerge. The school report of history may report areas where we 'could do better'. categorically as a participant I would feel honour bound to study a 'could do better' charge. But this book is not about salving a conscience. Rather it is an attempt to study the question: if classic strategy is key to success in the great strategic endeavours of our time, how could we do better? As such the up-to-date past should be of interest to us not for apportioning blame but rather as a source of insights to allow us to 'do better', to originate and execute more effective strategy in the future. And we need to be prompt in studying these lessons because today's strategic leaders and strategists have work to do.

What we sometimes forget about strategy is that not only does it matter - but very often it matters now. When we get it wrong, we may fail to perform principal political objectives. Precious and sometimes irreplaceable resources may be squandered. And too many will pay in blood. So I hope that scholars will forgive the flaws and roughness herein. Some of the system feels raw and must be challenged. But for now my colleagues at the strategic level and their agents in the tactical field, are the ones who need our help, those people whose faces are marred by the dust and sweat and blood of the strategic arena.

Some say development strategy is easy. I plainly do not agree. Nor does history. If it were easy, categorically we would always be successful? categorically the campaigns in the Balkans, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq would have played out as their designers intended? Rather, as I said at the outset, strategy development is problem-solving of the most involved order because it deals with three of life's great imponderables, people, war and the future. But this does not mean that it is not susceptible to hard thinking. categorically the historical report seems to shows that hard reasoning by talented people is the cornerstone of strategic success. But, to better focus our hard thinking, we will need to turn strategy development into something other than Admiral Wylie's 'disorganized, undisciplined activity'. And if the system presented in this book helps those creating and executing strategy do so in a more organized and disciplined way, my work will be done.

Strategy for Action: Using Force Wisely in the 21st Century

Tags : todays world news headlines